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The Role of International
Organizations in the
Development of International
Environmental Law: Adjusting
the Lenses of Analysis
Rita Guerreiro Teixeira *
Abstract
International organizations have gradually moved beyond
constituting mere fora for negotiations between states and have
assumed a more active role in law-making. In the environmental field,
international organizations engage in a variety of functions. For
example, the UN has convened the Global Conferences, leading to the
adoption of foundational declarations of principles, and numerous other
international organizations have prepared draft texts, promoted the
conclusion of environmental agreements, adopted standards, guidelines
and recommendations, and prepared influential studies. Additionally,
novel institutional arrangements have been established by multilateral
environmental agreements, which often include a Conference of the
Parties empowered to develop the treaty obligations through innovative
legislative processes which do not always require consent by all state
parties.
While these various instruments have influenced the development
of international environmental norms, the extent and the processes
through which they have done so remain unaccounted for. This article
argues that the traditional account of the sources of international law,
reliant on the triad of formal sources in Article 38(1) of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice, and the strict division between hard
and soft law, which still dominates the mainstream discourse, is unable
to fully grasp the nature of institutional law-making. This is
particularly relevant in the environmental field, where scientific
uncertainties and states’ frequent unwillingness to commit to farreaching (often high cost) solutions make the negotiation of traditional
international treaties and the development of customary rules more
challenging and have led to the development of novel and dynamic lawmaking processes, often led by international organizations.
Additionally, it contends that the first step to develop an allencompassing account of the role of international organizations in the
development of environmental law is to abandon the a priori labelling
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of instruments into the categories of binding or nonbinding (or hard
versus soft law), which only considers their immediate intended effects
and predetermines the result of any analysis into their broader lawmaking characteristics. Instead, it proposes that it is necessary to ignore
the strict binary law versus non-law when conducting research into the
normative outputs of international organizations, allowing for the
collection and analysis of the broadest variety of instruments and their
individual characteristics.
The article concludes that only through such research can new ways
of categorizing the “infinite variety” of instruments of international
organizations be proposed and international lawyers can start
developing the new analytical tools they need to advance the study of
institutional law-making today.
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1.

Introduction

International organizations have had a significant role in the
development of international environmental law. They are present in
every step of norm development—they set the agenda for international
negotiations, prepare draft conventions, adopt guidelines and codes of
conduct, directly alter the content of—or develop—treaty obligations,
and adopt compliance regimes. 1 Furthermore, novel institutional
1.

See generally Daniel Bodansky et al., International Environmental Law:
Mapping the Field, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INT’L ENV’T L. 1, 17–
19 (Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2008); Gerhard Loibl, The Role of
International Organisations in International Law-Making International
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arrangements have been established by multilateral environmental
agreements (“MEAs”), which often include a Conference of the Parties
(“COP”) empowered to develop the treaty obligations through
innovative legislative processes that do not always require consent by
all state parties. 2
However, the theory of international law-making has largely failed
to catch-up with developments in practice. International lawyers
attempting to capture the normative output of international
organizations in their entirety have long struggled with the shackles of
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice
(“ICJ”) and the triad of formal sources of international law. This
difficulty has only grown because of the expanding role that
international organizations play in fields such as environmental
protection and the variety of instruments they adopt. As a result, a
relevant part of the instruments of international organizations remains
understudied regarding their characteristics and effects—and most of
them have been relegated to the category of “soft law,” a concept that
is widely underexplained and, as such, remains limited in its usefulness.
This article deals with these challenges and proposes a framework
to move the debate forward. Part 2 provides a brief overview of the
different roles that international organizations have played in the
development of international environmental law. Part 3 discusses the
relation between the normative instruments of international
organizations in this field and the formal sources of international law,
concluding that this relation is insufficient to explain the impact of
those instruments in law-making processes. Accordingly, I argue that
the formalist account of the sources of international law and the strict
division between hard and soft law, which still dominates the
mainstream discourse, is unable to fully grasp the nature of institutional
law-making as it stands today.
Finally, Part 4 sets some guidelines for future research in the field.
It proposes that an all-encompassing analysis of the practice of different
organizations operating in the environmental field should guide future
developments in theory and we should set aside the a priori distinction
between binding and nonbinding instruments. This is the first step in
developing a new language and new analytical tools that will allow for
a better discussion of the variety of normative outputs of international
organizations.

Environmental Negotiations – an Empirical Study, 1 NON-STATE
ACTORS & IN’TL L. 41, 43 (2001); Julia Sommer, Environmental LawMaking by International Organizations, 56 HEIDELBERG J. INT’L L. 628
(1996).
2.

See Bodansky et al., supra note 1, at 19.
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2. International organizations as actors in the
development of international environmental law
Nearly all international organizations today have included issues of
environmental protection and sustainable development in their work
programs, contributing to a complex and diverse scheme of global
environmental governance. 3 The United Nations (“UN”) has been
occupied with environmental concerns since the 1960s, although
notably, no reference to the environment can be found in the UN
Charter. 4 It was the UN that convened the Global Conferences in
Stockholm and Rio, as well as the Conference on the Law of the Sea,
leading to the negotiation and adoption of the UN Framework
Convention on Climate Change (“UNFCCC”), 5 the Convention on
Biological Diversity (“Biodiversity Convention”), 6 and the UN
Convention of the Law of the Sea (“UNCLOS”). 7 The UN General
Assembly established the UN Environmental Programme (“UNEP”) in
1972 and the Commission on Sustainable Development (“CSD”) in
1992. 8 These bodies, having mostly recommendatory powers, have
played a significant role in environmental governance. 9 Several
environmental conventions such as the Convention on Migratory
Species, 10 the Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone
Layer, 11 the Basel Convention on Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes (“Basel Convention”), 12 and the Biodiversity
Convention were concluded under the auspices of the UNEP, following
3.

Loibl, supra note 1.

4.

See generally U.N. Charter. It is now largely uncontroversial that those
powers can be implied from the UN broad mandate of furtherance of
international cooperation in solving economic and social problems. See
PATRICIA BIRNIE ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT
58–59 (Oxford Univ. Press, 3d ed. 2009).

5.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992,
1771 U.N.T.S. 107.

6.

Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, 1760 U.N.T.S. 79.

7.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397.

8.

G.A. Res. 2997 (XXVII) (Dec. 15, 1972); G.A. Res. 47/191 (Dec. 22,
1992).

9.

See, e.g., G.A. Res. 47/191 (Jan. 29, 1993).

10.

Convention on the Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals,
June 23, 1979, 1651 U.N.T.S. 333.

11.

Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985,
1513 U.N.T.S. 293.

12.

Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, 1673 U.N.T.S. 57.
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the priorities set out in its 1982 and 1993 Montevideo Programmes.13
Furthermore, the UNEP developed several principles, guidelines, and
standards on conservation and use of shared national resources, marine
environment protection, hazardous waste management, environmental
impact assessment, and others, 14 including the Cairo Guidelines and
Principles for the Environmentally Sound Management of Hazardous
Waste 15 and the UNEP Goals and Principles on Environmental Impact
Assessment. 16 The CSD, in turn, is primarily responsible for reviewing
the implementation of Agenda 21, having a broad list of monitoring,
review, and recommendatory tasks. 17 It meets annually and provides a
diplomatic forum for continued negotiations concerning sustainable
development. 18 It has mostly approved political recommendations.19
Additionally, the International Law Commission (“ILC”), a subsidiary
body of the UN General Assembly, has conducted relevant work on the
codification of the law relating to international watercourses and the
prevention of transboundary harm and, more recently, environmental
protection during armed conflict and protection of the atmosphere. 20

13.

U.N. Env’t Programme, Montevideo Programme for the Development and
Periodic Review on Environmental Law, Decision 10/21 of the Governing
Council of UNEP (May 31, 1982); U.N. Env’t Programme, Programme
for the Development and Periodic Review on Environmental Law for the
1990s (June 1993).

14.

See generally BIRNIE
60–63.

15.

U.N. Env’t Programme, Cairo Guidelines and Principles for the
Environmentally
Sound
Management
of
Hazardous
Wastes,
UNEP/GC.14/17, Annex II (1987).

16.

U.N.
Env’t
Programme,
Environmental
UNEP/GC/DEC/14/25 (June 17, 1987).

17.

G.A. Res. 47/191, supra note 9, ¶ 4(c).

18.

See id. ¶ 9.

19.

See generally id. ¶ 14(c).

20.

See, e.g., Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its
Forty-Sixth Session, Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-Navigational
Uses of International Watercourses and Commentaries Thereto and
Resolution on Transboundary Confined Groundwater, 49 U.N. GAOR
Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/49/10 (1994), reprinted in [1997] 2 Y.B. Int’l
Comm’n, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/1994/Add.1; Int’l Law Comm’n
Rep. on the Work of Its Fifty-Third Session, Draft Articles on Prevention
of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities (2001); Int’l Law
Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of its Seventieth Session, Protection of the
Atmosphere, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.909 (June 6, 2018); Int’l Law Comm’n,
Rep. on the Work of its Seventy-First Session, Protection of the
Environment in Relation to Armed Conflicts, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.937
(June 6, 2019).

ET AL.,

supra note 4, at 68; Loibl, supra note 1, at
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UN specialized agencies have also assumed responsibilities for
environmental protection; most have developed their powers in this
field through broad interpretations of their constitutive treaties and
practice. 21 These include the International Maritime Organization
(“IMO”), the Food and Agricultural Organization (“FAO”), the World
Bank, the UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the
UN Industrial Development Organization (“UNIDO”), and the
International Fund for Agriculture.
Other international organizations, which mainly operate in different
fields, also engage with the environment—such as the World Trade
Organization (“WTO”) and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (“OECD”).22 Finally, most regional
organizations also act on environmental matters—in Europe, the UN
Economic Commission for Europe (“UNECE”), the Council of Europe,
the European Union, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (“OSCE”), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(“NATO”) have all acted in the field. 23
These organizations have been undertaking a range of law-making
activities. 24 They have promoted the negotiation of environmental
conventions—IMO developed conventions related to pollution from
vessels, including the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from Ships (“MARPOL”) 25 and the Convention for the
Control and Management of Ship’s Ballast Water and Sediments; 26
FAO developed the International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources
for Food and Agriculture27 and the Rotterdam Convention on the Prior
Informed Consent Procedure for Certain Hazardous Chemicals and

21.

BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 4, at 59.

22.

See Francesca Romanin Jacur, The Making of International
Environmental Law, in RSCH. HANDBOOK ON THE THEORY AND PRAC.
OF INT’L LAWMAKING 419, 419 (Catherine Brölmann & Yannick Radi
eds., 2016).

23.

See BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 4, at 72–73, for the role of UNECE in
developing regional environmental law.

24.

See id. at 71–84.

25.

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, Nov.
2, 1973, 1340 U.N.T.S. 184.

26.

International Convention for the Control and Management of Ships’
Ballast Water and Sediments, Adoption of the Final Act and Any
Instruments, Recommendations and Resolutions Resulting from the Work
of the Conference U.N. Doc BWM/CONF/36 (Feb. 16, 2004).

27.

International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and
Agriculture, Nov. 3, 2001, 2400 U.N.T.S. 303.
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Pesticides in International Trade (“PIC Convention”), 28 the latter
together with UNEP. They have established new bodies and
institutions—together FAO, the International Labour Organization
(“ILO”), UNIDO, the World Health Organization (“WHO”), UNEP
and OECD established the Inter-Organization Programme for the
Sound Management of Chemicals through a memorandum of
understanding. 29 They established implementation mechanisms—the
World Bank cooperates in the implementation of MEA based regimes
through a variety of funding schemes and acts as a trustee for the
Global Environment Facility (“GEF”), an institution established
jointly by the World Bank, UNEP, and the UN Development Program
with the objective of facilitating the transfer of funds and technology
from developed to developing states to help the latter meet the
incremental costs of implementing environmental measures. 30 They
provide expert advice and technical consultations for international
negotiations—FAO provided expert and influential advice, for instance,
in the negotiation of the Convention on Fishing and Conservation of
the Living Resources of the High Seas, 31 the UNCLOS, and the 1995
Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks; 32 the
WTO and UNEP published a joint report addressing the linkages
between trade and climate change, introducing new concepts at a
critical time of negotiations over a post-Kyoto climate change treaty. 33

28.

Rotterdam Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for
Certain Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, Sept.
10, 1998, 2244 U.N.T.S. 337.

29.

Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Establishment of the InterOrganization Programme for the Sound Management of Chemicals,
WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION [WHO] (1994),
https://www.who.int/iomc/participants/iomc-mou.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8VRS-YNMY].

30.

Global Environment Facility [GEF], Instrument for the Establishment of
the Restructured Global Environment Facility, (September 2019),
https://www.thegef.org/documents/instrument-establishmentrestructured-gef.

31.

Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the
High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 559 U.N.T.S. 285.

32.

Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the
Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks, Aug. 4, 1995, 2167 U.N.T.S. 3; BIRNIE ET AL.,
supra note 4, at 74.

33.

World Trade Org. & U.N. Env’t Programme, Trade and Climate Change
(2009); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Mapping a Hidden World of International
Regulatory Cooperation, 78 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 267, 284 (2015).
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Finally, these international organizations play an important role in
international standard setting. 34 The wide range of instruments they
have adopted in this context include the Codex Alimentarius—a set of
food standards, guidelines and codes of practice aimed at contributing
to the safety, quality, and fairness of international food trade adopted
by the WHO and FAO— 35 the annexes on ship safety and pollution
adopted by the IMO 36 the CO2 emission standards for air transport
adopted by the International Civil Aviation Organization 37 and the
WHO standards on air quality. 38
In addition to these, MEAs established a great number of
institutional arrangements; most MEAs are designed as framework
conventions, laying down only general obligations and establishing their
own institutional structures with powers to develop and specify the
obligations contained in the treaty. 39 They usually set up a permanent
plenary organ, known as COP, and auxiliary organs (such as
secretariats, financial mechanisms, and subsidiary technical organs,
advising on scientific, legal, and economic aspects). 40 COPs are
normally tasked with adopting concrete measures necessary for
implementing the broad objectives set out in MEAs, often through the
adoption of amendments and protocols (which are generally
subsequently ratified by the parties), development and amendment of
(binding) technical annexes, and elaboration and adoption of
nonbinding guidelines and recommendations that are needed to make
key provisions of the agreement operational. 41
An example of this institutional dynamic is found in the COP to
the UNFCCC, which is entrusted with regularly reviewing the
implementation of the obligations under the convention and related
instruments, making the decisions necessary to promote its effective
implementation,
adopting
regular
reports,
and
making
recommendations. 42 Furthermore, it can adopt amendments to the
convention by a three-fourths majority vote of the parties present and
34.

Paolo Contini & Peter H. Sand, Methods to Expedite Environment
Protection: International Ecostandards, 66 AM. J. INT’L L. 37, 40 (1972).

35.

Id. at 44.

36.

Id. at 43.

38.

Id. at 42; BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 4, at 74–75.

38.

Contini & Sand, supra note 34, at 42.

39.

See generally Jutta Brunnée, COPing with Consent: Law-Making Under
Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 15 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. (2002).

40.

See id. at 4.

41.

Romanin Jacur, supra note 22, at 422. See Brunnée, supra note 39, at 17–
32.

42.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note
5, at art. 7(1).
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voting if no consensus can be reached. 43 Importantly, the COP to the
UNFCCC adopted the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, regulating greenhouse
gases emissions and establishing a new institutional structure, the
Meeting of the Parties (“MOP”) to the Kyoto Protocol. 44 Similarly, the
COP to the Biodiversity Convention is empowered to adopt protocols
and amendments to the convention and its annexes, create subsidiary
bodies deemed necessary to implement the convention, and establish
appropriate forms of cooperation with bodies from other conventions.45
Amendments to the Biodiversity Convention are adopted by unanimity
or, failing that, by a two-thirds majority vote of the parties present and
voting at the meeting, and shall be submitted to the parties for
ratification, acceptance or approval. 46 In 2000, the COP adopted the
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, which deals with the handling,
transport and use of living modified organisms resulting from modern
biotechnology. 47 In 2010 the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic
Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from
their Utilization was adopted. 48
In some other cases, however, MEAs and their protocols established
innovative approaches to amendment procedures, in which changes can
enter into force without consent from all state parties, making them
more expedited. 49 An example can be found with the powers conferred
to the MOP of the Montreal Protocol of Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, which can adopt amendments to the annexes to the
protocol, adding or removing substances, and decide on the
mechanisms, scope and timing of control measures. 50 These decisions of
the MOP are taken by consensus or, if that fails, by a two-thirds
majority vote of the parties present and voting and they are binding on

43.

Id. at art. 15(3).

44.

Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 2303 U.N.T.S. 162 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].

45.

Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 6, at art. 23.

46.

Id. at art. 29(3).

47.

Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000, 2226 U.N.T.S. 208.

48.

Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and
Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization to the
Convention on Biological Diversity, Oct. 29, 2010, U.N.T.C. Registration
No. 30619.

49.

See PHILIPPE SANDS, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 138–39 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 2d ed. 2003).

50.

Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept. 16,
1987, 1522 U.N.T.S. 3 at art. 2(10).
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all parties, 51 unless they notify an objection to the depository within six
months of approval. 52 A similar procedure is provided for the
amendment of the annexes of a “scientific, technical, procedural or
administrative character” to the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol.53
The MOP to the Montreal Protocol can, however, also adopt
adjustments to the ozone depleting potentials of the substances already
listed in the annexes and to their phase-out schedules with a qualified
majority involving both developed and developing states. These enter
into force for all state parties, without any possibility to opt out. 54 This
type of expedited amendment procedure is justified by the need to
quickly update environmental treaties to incorporate technical and
scientific developments, as well as changes of economic and political
nature. 55 Furthermore, this normative setting provides for a dynamic
and iterative process for the development of international
environmental legislation, where scientific and technical expertise play
a significant role. 56 In fact, MEAs often create scientific or technical
bodies (usually subsidiary bodies to the COPs) and rely upon the work
of independent advisory bodies as well as integrate scientific
information into law-making and compliance processes. 57
These developments in normative processes inside international
organizations are increasingly at odds with a traditional account of
international law-making, still dependent on state consent and where
the international organizations have little autonomy from their
members. 58 Additionally, as international organizations are drafting the
texts of environmental treaties, adopting standards and guidelines that
effectively regulate areas of practice, and developing treaty obligations,
in some cases dispensing with the need for state consent, it becomes
increasingly challenging to explain the making of international
environmental law through the lenses of formalism and the exclusivity

51.

Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, supra note 11,
at arts. 9(4) and 10(2).

52.

Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, supra
note 50, at art. 10(2).

53.

Kyoto Protocol, supra note 44, at art. 21; United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, supra note 5, at art. 16(1-4).

54.

Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, supra
note 50, at art. 2(9)(d).

55.

Romanin Jacur, supra note 22, at 424; SANDS, supra note 49, at 138.

56.

See generally Bodansky et al., supra note 1, at 18–20.

57.

Jutta Brunnée, Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law:
Environment, Multilateral Agreements ¶¶ 38–40 (Oxford University
Press Jan. 2011).

58.

See Bodansky et al., supra note 1, at 21–22.
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of the formal sources of international law. The next section deals with
these challenges.

3. The insufficiency of the formal sources of
international law
The capacity to develop international norms is often mentioned as
one of constitutive elements of international organizations and one the
reasons states decide to cooperate through these institutions.59
However, the exact terms and scope of their contribution to
international law-making are far from clear.
Traditionally, all norms of international law derive from one of the
formal sources listed in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the ICJ: treaties,
custom and general principles of law. 60 Notably, instruments of
international organizations are absent from this list, which has posed a
challenge to the many authors trying to capture their normative
relevance. 61 In most cases international organizations are only
empowered to make recommendations to their member states (in the
form of resolutions, declarations, or guidelines); while the power to
adopt binding acts is only exceptionally granted. 62 Having noted this,
international lawyers found refuge in the category of “soft law” to
describe the majority of their normative instruments. 63
Despite there being no consensus on the concept, a relatively
uncontroversial definition of soft law is a set of non-binding instruments
containing principles, norms, standards, or other statements of expected
59.

NIELS M. BLOKKER & HENRY G. SCHERMERS, INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONAL LAW: UNITY WITHIN DIVERSITY § 1216 (Nijhoff 5th rev.
ed. 2011); PHILIPPE SANDS ET AL., BOWETT’S LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
INSTITUTIONS 267 (Sweet & Maxwell 6th ed. 2009); Kenneth W. Abbott
& Duncan Snidal, Why States Act through Formal International
Organizations, 42 J. OF CONFLICT RESOL. 3, 15 (1998).

60.

See generally NIGEL WHITE, THE LAW OF
ORGANISATIONS 159 (Manchester Univ. Press 2005).

61.

Cf. a short overview of these attempts in Jan Klabbers, The Normative
Gap in International Organizations Law: The Case of the World Health
Organization, 16 INT. ORGAN. LAW. REV. 272, 273 (2019).

62.

Cf. Ian Johnstone, Law-Making by International Organizations, in
INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES ON INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 266, 272 (Jeffrey L. Dunoff & Mark A.
Pollack eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 2012); see Ellen Hey, International
Institutions, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INT’L ENV’T L. 750, 755
(Daniel Bodansky et al. eds., 2007).

63.

See Catherine Redgwell, Sources of International Environmental Law:
Formality and Informality in the Dynamic Evolution of International
Environmental Law Norms, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON THE
SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 955 (Samantha Besson & Jean
d’Aspremont eds., 2017).
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behavior. 64 Several authors agree that, although these commitments
cannot be forcibly enforced, they still give rise to some level of
compliance expectation. 65
With respect to international environmental law, it is suggested
that it is a “particularly fertile area for soft law norms,” where they
permit reaching agreements on international action in areas where
scientific uncertainties make it difficult for states to agree on binding
long-term agreements. 66 To justify the legal relevance of these
instruments, albeit their non-binding character, several authors argue
that they can give rise to legal obligations in certain situations—i.e.,
become hard law—through a relation with one of the formal sources of
international law. 67 For example: (i) the drafts of the UNFCCC and the
Biodiversity Convention, prepared under UN auspices, acquired legal
force when they were signed as treaties by states; (ii) the adoption of
the Stockholm Declaration contributed to the codification of the duty
to prevent transboundary harm as a rule of customary international
law; and (iii) the inclusion of the common but differentiated
responsibilities and the polluter-pays principles in the Rio Declaration

64.

Dinah Shelton, International Law and “Relative Normativity,” in
INTERNATIONAL LAW 137, 159 (Malcolm D. Evans ed., Oxford Univ.
Press 4th ed. 2014); see WHITE, supra note 60. Some authors use the term
soft law to refer to rules that are included in binding legal instruments
but are imprecise in their terms, rendering them non-justiciable and notenforceable – see, most notably, Prosper Weil, Towards Relative
Normativity in International Law, 77 AM. J. INT’L L. 413, 414 (1983).
This is not the use of the term that is considered in this article.

65.

Thirlway provides a working definition of soft law, according to which it
is “a system of international commitments or obligations that are not
regarded by those concerned as binding in the sense that can be enforced
in the same way, as those imposed by international law proper but yet
are considered as something more than mere political gestures, so that
there is an expectation of compliance even if there is no legal duty.” HUGH
THIRLWAY, THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 188–89 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2nd ed. 2019). See also Alan Boyle, Soft Law in International
Law-Making, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 118, 120–21 (Malcolm D. Evans
ed., Oxford Univ. Press 5th ed. 2018); Shelton, supra note 64, at 160;
BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 4, at 34.

66.

Redgwell, supra note 63, at 956; see also Jutta Brunnée, Sources of
International Environmental Law: Interactional Law, in THE OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF THE SOURCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 960, 978–79
(Samantha Besson & Jean d’Aspremont eds., Oxford University Press
2017); BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 4, at 34–36.

67.

See, e.g., THIRLWAY, supra note 65, at 192–94; Boyle, supra note 65, at
120–21; Redgwell, supra note 63, at 955–56; Shelton, supra note 64, at
161; ALAN BOYLE & CHRISTINE CHINKIN, THE MAKING OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 214–29 (2017).
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contributed to their emergence as general principles of law. 68 However,
this is only part of the story of how these instruments impact the
development of international environmental law.
3.1. Treaties and treaty instruments

Treaties are the most common instrument through which generally
applicable rules of environmental law have been developed. 69 The
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, 70 the
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora, 71 the UNCLOS, 72 the Basel Convention, 73 the
UNFCCC, 74 and the Biodiversity Convention 75 are some examples of
the numerous MEAs concluded during the past few decades.
While the conclusion of treaties remains, largely, the domain of
states, under certain circumstances international organizations can
intervene in the process. In some cases, the constitutive instrument of
an organization explicitly provides for the power to prepare and adopt
drafts of conventions to be later signed by member states. This is the
case of the IMO, which, under the powers conferred by Article 2 of the
IMO Convention, 76 has adopted several conventions related to the
prevention of marine pollution, among them MARPOL. 77
In other cases, the preparation of draft conventions and the
convening of international conferences has become the practice of an
organization. The most evident example of this is the practice of the
68.

See Boyle, supra note 65, at 120–21; Redgwell, supra note 63, at 955–56;
Shelton, supra note 64, at 159–160.

69.

See Redgwell, supra note 63, at 944; Brunnée, supra note 66, at 968;
SANDS, supra note 49, at 126.

70.

International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, Dec. 2, 1946, 161
U.N.T.S 72.

71.

Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna
and Flora, Mar. 3, 1973, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.

72.

United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, supra note 7.

73.

Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, supra note 12.

74.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note
5.

75.

Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 6.

76.

Convention on the International Maritime Organization, Mar. 17, 1958,
289 U.N.T.S. 1, art. 3. Later renumbered according with the amendment
of 1977. Amendments to the title and substantive provisions of the
Convention on the International Maritime Organization, Nov. 9, 1977,
1285 U.N.T.S. 318.

77.

International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships,
supra note 25.
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UN itself, which has convened the Global Conferences on the
Environment and was involved in the preparation of draft texts for the
UNFCCC, the Biodiversity Convention on, and the PIC Convention
(together with FAO), to name just a few. 78 Finally, it has been common
for environmental treaties to incorporate the content of previous
guidelines or standards drafted by international organizations—for
instance, the UNEP Goals and Principles on Environmental Impact
Assessment were substantially incorporated in the Convention on
Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary Context 79 and
the Cairo Guidelines and Principles for the Environmentally Sound
Management of Hazardous Waste provided the basis for negotiations of
the Basel Convention. 80
These practices do not raise any problems under a formalistic
account of sources of international law—it has long been recognized
that drafts prepared by international organizations can be incorporated
into international negotiations and lead to the conclusion of a treaty,
thus conferring binding force to the text. 81 However, the specific
scientific and political constraints that characterize the environmental
field have led to the development of new, more flexible processes for
treaty-making and treaty-adaptation, which are led by international
organizations and challenge the traditional account of sources as
discussed in the following paragraphs.
Some of these constraints arise from heavily relying on scientific
assessments to identify both environmental problems and effective
solutions. These assessments are often unclear about the causes of the
problems and the best approaches change over time as science and the
environment quickly evolve. 82 In addition, while environmental
challenges are diverse among themselves, often involving different
policy areas and divergent interests, they are closely interconnected,

78.

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note
5; Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note 6; Rotterdam
Convention on the Prior Informed Consent Procedure for Certain
Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade, supra note
28.

79.

Convention on Environmental Impact Assessment in a Transboundary
Context, Feb. 25, 1991, 34028 U.N.T.S. 1.

80.

Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of
Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, supra note 12.

81.

See generally Boyle, supra note 65, at 126–27; BLOKKER & SCHERMERS,
supra note 59, § 1266; BOYLE & CHINKIN, supra note 67, at 216.

82.

Brunnée, supra note 57, ¶ 1; Bodansky et al., supra note 1, at 7–8; Robin
R. Churchill & Geir Ulfstein, Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in
Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in
International Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 623, 628 (2000).
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requiring holistic approaches that are not easy to achieve. 83 Finally,
human activity that has harmful impacts on the environment is mostly
caused by industrial and technological developments, requiring costly
adjustments in production and consumption models and accentuating
inequalities between developed and developing states. 84 These aspects
make it difficult for states to achieve broad consensus in international
negotiations and make the field difficult to address through a
comprehensive set of rules and commitments set out in one (or even a
few) instruments. Instead, the UNEP register of environmental
agreements counts 272 agreements adopted between 1920 and 2005.85
This difficulty is the reason why the field has been regulated,
mostly, through MEAs—each often addressing only one environmental
issue and designed as framework conventions. 86 The outcome of this
practice are regimes in which treaties are merely “the tip of the
normative iceberg” and the majority of norms that detail the
obligations assumed by states are developed in subsequent protocols or
through binding and non-binding decisions of the COP. 87 As noted,
amendments to treaty or protocol norms are often adopted by
consensus or, as a last resort, by a qualified majority vote of the parties
at a COP or the MOP. 88 Moreover, at least in the case of certain
amendments to the annexes of the Montreal Protocol, there is no
provided possibility for objecting states to opt out. 89 These procedures
clearly deviate from the rules on treaty amendment provided for in the
83.

Katja Biedenkopf, Relations Between International Organisations in
Combating Climate Change, in PALGRAVE HANDBOOK OF INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONS IN WORLD POLITICS 649, 650 (Joachim A.
Koops & Rafael Biermann eds., Palgrave Macmillan U.K. 2017);
Bodansky et al., supra note 1, at 8.

84.

Brunnée, supra note 57, ¶ 1; BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 4, at 34, 40.

85.

See United Nations Environment Programme [UNEP], Register of
International Treaties and Other Agreements in the Field of the
Environment, UNEP/Env.Law/2005/3 (Dec. 30, 2005).

86.

Romanin Jacur, supra note 22, at 420; Loibl, supra note 1, at 42–43.

87.

Bodansky et al., supra note 1, at 21; see also BIRNIE
4, at 17.

88.

E.g., Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of
Wastes and Other Matter, Dec. 29, 1972, 1046 U.N.T.S. 138, at art. XV;
Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, supra note 11,
at arts. 8–9; Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, supra note 50, at arts. 9–10; Basel Convention on the Control of
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal,
supra note 12, at art. 17; Convention on Biological Diversity, supra note
6, at arts. 29–30; United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, supra note 5, at arts. 15–16. Cf. Hey, supra note 62, at 756–57.

89.

See Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, supra
note 50, at art. 2 ¶ 9(d).
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Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, according to which all states
must agree to an amendment to be bound by it. 90 In fact, a marked
feature of the environmental treaty system is that decisions on new
standards, or adaptation of existing ones, can be taken within the
institutional frameworks created by MEAs through simplified
legislative procedures, instead of requiring states to go back to lengthy
treaty negotiations. 91
Furthermore, these features of the decision-making procedures of
the institutional structures of MEAs highlight the limited explanatory
force of the “treaty analogy,” which attempts to explain the bindingness
of decisions of international organizations through the combined will of
all their members who participate in the discussions and consent to be
bound. More generally, they challenge the strict requirement of state
consent that characterizes the first formal source of international law
and set aside the idea that COPs and MOPs are mere treaty bodies
instead of autonomous institutional structures. 92
3.2. Custom

The identification of a rule of customary international law requires,
as established in Article 38(1)(b) of the ICJ Statute, evidence of two
elements: general practice and opinio iuris. 93 To qualify as general
practice, a practice must be consistent (albeit not uniform), 94 extensive
(albeit not universal), 95 and include those states whose interests are

90.

Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, art. 38.

91.

See, e.g., Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer,
supra note 50, at art. 11 ¶ 4(h)–(j).

92.

Churchill and Ulfstein have produced one of the most in-depth analysis
of these “autonomous institutional arrangements”, which, they argue,
possess the three basic elements of the definitions of an international
organizations ((i) being founded on an international agreement, (ii)
having at least one organ with a will of its own, and (iii) being established
under international law). Accordingly, they conclude that the
institutional arrangements of MEAs should be considered as an
international organization, albeit of a less formal, more ad hoc nature
than traditional ones. Churchill & Ulfstein, supra note 82, at 632–3.

93.

Statute of the I.C.J., Oct. 24, 1945, 33 U.N.T.S. 993, art. 38(1)(b)
[hereinafter Statute of the I.C.J.]; Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Conclusions on
Identification of Customary International Law, U.N. Doc. A/73/10, at
124 (2018).

94.

See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), Merits, Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 186 (June 27); North
Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger. v. Den.; Ger. v. Neth.), Merits,
Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 74 (Feb. 20).

95.

See Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. ¶186.
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specially affected. 96 The elapsing of any particular period is not
essential. 97 To give rise to a customary rule, the general practice must
be undertaken with a sense of legal obligation, i.e., it must be
accompanied by opinio iuris. 98
Whereas it is the practice of states that is considered most
determinant in finding the emergence of a new rule of custom (and, for
that reason, the first element of custom is often referred to as “state
practice,” even if that is not the wording in the ICJ Statute), 99 it has
gradually been recognized that the practice of international
organizations can also be relevant, and it is usually taken into
account. 100
In its recent work on identification of customary international law,
the ILC explicitly stated that “[i]n certain cases, the practice of
international organizations also contributes to the formation, or
expression, of rules of customary international law.” 101 The ILC
specified what the cases are in which the practice of the organizations
themselves, as separate from the practice of their member states, counts
towards the requirement of general practice. 102 According to this expert
body, practice can only be relevant in relation to “those rules (a) whose
subject matter falls within the mandate of the organizations, and/or
(b) that are addressed specifically to them (such as those on their
international responsibility or relating to treaties to which international
organizations may be parties).” 103
Additionally, practices of organizations that have a larger number
of member states, that are directly carried out on behalf of those
members or endorsed by them, and are not ultra vires will have greater
weight in relation to the formation, or expression, of rules of customary
international law. 104 According to these criteria, it is plausible that the
practice of those institutional structures established by MEAs will be
particularly relevant in the development of international environmental
law, particularly since some of them have a broad membership and are
96.

Ger. v. Den.; Ger. v. Neth, 1969 I.C.J. ¶ 73.

97.

See id.

98.

Int’l L. Comm’n, Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary Int’l
Law, with Commentaries, U.N. Doc. A/73/10, at 138 (2018) [hereinafter
ILC Draft Conclusions].

99.

Michael Wood & Sender Omri, State Practice, ¶¶ 1–2 (2017).

100. E.g., ILC Draft Conclusions, supra note 98, at 130; Maurice H. Mendelson,
The Formation of Customary International Law, in 272 ACADÉMIE DE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL RECUEIL DES COURS 155, 201–3 (1999).
101. ILC Draft Conclusions, supra note 98, at 130.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 131.
104. Id.
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granted broad powers to interpret, apply, and even modify the
agreement.
As for opinio iuris, while the ILC draft conclusions seem to only
refer to states in their enumeration of the forms of evidence of this
element, the commentary makes it clear that the list applies mutatis
mutandis to the practice of international organizations that can
evidence acceptance as law. 105
Under these terms, resolutions, decisions, and other instruments of
international organizations can have an impact on the development of
customary international law. They can, similarly to the practice of
states, codify existing rules, start the process for the formation of a new
rule, or arrest the development of a rule. 106 Additionally, the attitudes
of member states towards them can reveal state practice and opinio
iuris of states themselves. 107 Accordingly, when in the Advisory Opinion
on the Legality of the Threat and Use of Nuclear Weapons the ICJ
recognized that the general obligation of states to ensure the activities
within their jurisdiction and control do not cause transboundary
environmental harm was part of customary international law, it referred
to principles in the Stockholm and Rio Declarations as expressing “the
common conviction of the States concerned that they have a duty.” 108
However, customary international law remains a limited source of
norms in the environment field. 109 Bodansky, Brunnée and Hey argue
that customary international law is just not well suited to produce the
kind of detailed regulation that environmental problems require, due to
the decentralized and uncoordinated processes through which it
develops, and, therefore, it can only produce some broad principles.110
In fact, a general practice with the level of detail and precision required
105. Id. at 141.
106. See generally id.
107. BLOKKER & SCHERMERS, supra note 39, §§ 1249–1252; SANDS ET AL.,
supra note 59, at 295–97; JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS AS LAW-MAKERS 591–95 (2005); BOYLE & CHINKIN,
supra note 67, at 212.
108. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, ¶¶ 27–29 (July 8).
109. In addition to the duty to prevent transboundary harm, it is argued that
the equitable and reasonable use of natural resources and certain
procedural obligations, such as consultation, provision of information, and
the obligation to carry out an environmental impact assessment for
activities likely to cause transboundary harm, have reached the status of
customary environmental law. See, e.g., Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay
(Arg. v. Uru.), Judgment, 2010 I.C.J. 14, ¶¶ 177, 204 (Apr. 20); ELLEN
HEY, ADVANCED INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW 59–62, 79–83 (2016); Redgwell, supra note 63, at 952–53; SANDS,
supra note 49, at 148.
110. Bodansky et al., supra note 1, at 23.
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is not easy to find and demonstrating the existence of opinio iuris is no
small challenge, as it is difficult to access the motives underlying the
actions of states and other relevant actors. 111 These difficulties add up
to the long-discussed identity crisis of customary international law,
related to the emergence of modern approaches that de-emphasize the
importance of general practice as a requirement of custom. 112 As a
result, this source is unlikely to be a main driver in the development of
international environmental law.
3.3. General principles of law

General principles of law are the final source of international law
recognized under Article 38 of the ICJ Statute. 113 A current account of
this source considers it to encompass two types of general principles:
general principles of municipal law, which are common to a majority of
states and which can be transposed to the international legal system,
and principles of international law, that develop directly in the
international legal system. 114 While the process for the identification of
general principles is not overtly clear, the key requirement seems to be
the verification that they enjoy general acceptance by states (also
referred to as endorsement or recognition). 115 General acceptance can
be derived either from the inclusion of a principle in municipal legal
111. See SANDS, supra note 49, at 144–46 (noting that few instances of
empirical research have been conducted into state practice relating to
international environmental obligations); see also DANIEL BODANSKY,
THE ART AND CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 198
(2010) (noting the difficulties of obtaining systematic information about
incidents on the ground even for delegates of the state).
112. Bruno Simma & Philip Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law:
Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Principles, 12 AUSTL. Y.B. INT’L L.
82, 88 (1988–1989); see also Andrew T. Guzman, Saving Customary
International Law, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 115, 118 (2005); Anthea
Elizabeth Roberts, Traditional and Modern Approaches to Customary
International Law: A Reconciliation, 95 AM. J. OF INT’L L. 757, 757–58
(2001). This approach finds support in the Nicaragua case, where the ICJ
delimited the content of the customary rule on the prohibition of the use
of force essentially from the wording of UN General Assembly resolutions
rather than the practice of states. Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Merits, Judgment, 1986 I.C.J.
Reports 14, ¶ 187 (1986).
113. Statute of the I.C.J., supra note 93, at art. 38(3).
114. Marcelo Vásquez-Bermúdez (Special Rapporteur), First Rep. on General
Principles of Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/732, ¶¶ 189–253 (2019);
THIRLWAY, supra note 65, at 108–9. But see Alain Pellet & Daniel Müller,
Article 38, in THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE: A COMMENTARY 819, 255 (Andreas Zimmermann et al. 3rd ed.
2019) for an example where 38(1)(c) is not interpreted to include the
second type of principles.
115. Simma & Alston, supra note 112, at 102.
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orders or from its deduction from rules of international law, which
states have already accepted, and declarations of states directly
recognizing the principle. 116
It is the second type of general principles that we are referring to
in the debate on whether certain “principles of international
environmental law” found in treaty provisions, the declarations of the
UN Conferences, and other non-binding instruments and widely
discussed in legal literature can be considered as general principles of
law. 117 The precautionary principle, the polluter-pays principle, the
principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, and the
principle of sustainable development are some of the most frequently
referenced candidates for recognition under this source of international
law. 118
The ILC Special Rapporteur on this topic identifies two processes
for the identification of general principles formed within the
international legal system—either they are “widely incorporated into
treaties and other international instruments, such as General Assembly
resolutions,” or they “underlie general rules of conventional or
customary international law.” 119 According to the Special Rapporteur,
these are two alternative forms of demonstrating recognition, which
must be wide, representative, and reflect a common understanding of
the community of nations to determine the identification of the general
principle. 120 In practice, the identification of a principle of international
environmental law will most likely require a combination of both
processes in order to gather enough evidence that it enjoys the
necessary general acceptance or recognition.
116. Marcelo Vásquez-Bermúdez (Special Rapporteur), Second Report on
General Principles of Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/741, ¶ 11 (2020)
[hereinafter ILC Second Report]; Beatrice I. Bonafé & Paolo Palchetti,
Relying on General Principles in International Law, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
MAKING 160, 163–64 (Catherine Brölmann & Yannick Radi eds., 2016).
See also Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Mali), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J.
Rep. 554, ¶ 24 (Dec. 22, 1986).
117. See generally SANDS, supra note 49 (describing such principles in detail).
118. U.N. Conference on Environment and Development, Rio Declaration on
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol.
I), annex I, ¶¶ 3, 4, 7, 15, 16 (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter Rio Declaration];
HEY, supra note 109, at 65–74; Pierre-Marie Dupuy, Overview of the
Existing Customary Legal Regime Regarding International Pollution, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLLUTION 451 (1991); SANDS, supra note 49,
at 48.
119. ILC Second Report, supra note 116, ¶¶ 122, 138; see also Bonafé and
Palchetti, supra note 117, at 162 (discussing the process of deduction
through which general principles can be inferred from existing
international conventional and customary rules).
120. ILC Second Report, supra note 116, ¶ 121.
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In this context, the various instruments of international
organizations, even non-binding instruments such as resolutions and
declarations, are relevant insofar as they recognize certain general
principles and demonstrate their acceptance by the community of
states, particularly when these are adopted by a large majority and
concern the interpretation or development of international law.121
Accordingly, the argument in favor of the recognition of the principle
of common but differentiated responsibilities as a general principle of
law relies on the express reference in Article 3 of the UNFCCC 122 and
in Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration, 123 as well as the provisions of the
Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, that establish differentiated
responsibilities for industrialized and non-industrialized states.124
Similarly, in favor of the recognition of the polluter pays-principle, it is
argued that it was embodied in the texts or preamble of several treaties,
Principle 16 of the Rio Declaration, and several recommendations by
the OECD. 125
121. BLOKKER & SCHERMERS, supra note 59, § 1253; BOYLE & CHINKIN,
supra note 67, at 222–25.
122. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, supra note
5, at art. 3(1).
123. Rio Declaration, supra note 118, ¶ 7.
124. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 44, at arts. 2–3; Paris Agreement to the
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change art. 2, 4, Dec.
12, 2015 T.I.A.S. No. 16-1104.
125. See e.g., Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, art. 3(2), Nov. 7,
1996; Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary
Watercourses and International Lakes, art. 2(5)(b), Mar. 17, 1992, 1936
U.N.T.S. 269 (1992); Convention for the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the North-East Atlantic, art. 2(2)(b), Mar. 25, 1992, 2354
U.N.T.S. 67; International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness,
Response and Cooperation, pmbl., May 13,1990, 1891 U.N.T.S. 77;
ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural
Resources, art. 10(d), July 9, 1985; Convention for the Protection of the
Mediterranean Sea against Pollution, art. 12, Feb. 12, 1978, 1102 U.N.T.S.
27. See also Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
[OECD], Recommendation of the Council on Guiding Principles
concerning International Economic Aspects of Environmental Policies,
¶¶ 2–5, OECD/LEGAL/0102 (May 26, 1972); Organisation for Economic
Co-operation and Development [OECD], Recommendation of the Council
on
the
Implementation
of
the
Polluter-Pays
Principle,
OECD/LEGAL/0132 (Nov. 14, 1974); Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], Recommendation of the Council on
the Application of the Polluter-Pays Principle to Accidental Pollution,
OECD/LEGAL/0251 (July 7, 1989); Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], Recommendation of the Council on
the Uses of Economic Instruments in Environmental Policy,
OECD/LEGAL/0258 (Jan. 30, 1991); ILC Second Report, supra note 116,
¶¶ 135–137.
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The legal force of the principles of international environmental law,
however, remains unclear. Many commentators discuss instead their
emergence as customary international law 126 or focus on their role in
providing frameworks for the legal and diplomatic efforts of states,
rather than their status as a source of law. 127
3.4. Narrative loopholes and the limitations of the hard law vs. soft law
dichotomy

The previous sections have illustrated how soft law instruments
adopted by international organizations have been incorporated into
treaty texts or contributed to the emergence of rules of customary
international law and general principles of law. However, this narrative,
which relies on the strict dichotomy between hard and soft law, only
tells us a small part of the story of institutional law-making and cannot
fully explain the impact these instruments have in the development of
international environmental law.
Firstly, this narrative cannot explain the persuasive force of certain
nonbinding instruments of international organizations with which
states frequently comply even in the absence of any relation to a formal
source. 128 This is notably the case of numerous standards adopted by
international organizations that establish thresholds of environmental
protection (including codes of conduct, guidelines, suggested practices).
As an example, the FAO International Code of Conduct on the
Distribution and Use of Pesticides 129 and UNEP London Guidelines for
the Exchange of Information on Chemicals in International Trade,130
which established soft law obligations for states not to export banned
126. BIRNIE ET AL., supra note 4, at 107–10; SANDS, supra note 49, at 148;
Dupuy, supra note 118, at 63–65.
127. Dupuy, supra note 118, at 461–62 (referring specifically to sustainable
development and to the precautionary principle). Dupuy sustains that the
distinction between custom and general principles is not particularly
relevant when looking at the processes for the development of
environmental law, as “both kinds of norms proceed from the same
progressive sedimentation of general statements, together with more or
less coherent state practice and sometimes assisted by judicial
consolidation,” id.
128. Nigel D. White, Lawmaking, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 566 (Jacob Katz Cogan et al. Nov.
2017); Matthias Goldmann, We Need to Cut Off the Head of the King:
Past, Present, and Future Approaches to International Soft Law, LEIDEN
J. OF INT’L L. 335, 335–36 (2012).
129. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Res. 10/85,
International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides
(Nov. 28, 1985).
130. The Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme
Decision 15/30, London Guidelines for the Exchange of Information on
Chemicals in International Trade (May 25, 1989).
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chemicals or pesticides without agreement from the importing states,
were widely accepted and implemented by states already before they
came to be incorporated in the PIC Convention. 131 Similarly, the
standards of the Codex Alimentarius, dealing with, among others,
maximum limits on pesticides, were widely applied by states and food
producers well before a reference to them was incorporated in the WTO
Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures. 132
In fact, although standard-setting constitutes a significant part of
the law-making activities of international organizations today, and
although it has proved to be a persuasive means of guiding state
conduct in several domains, it is a practice that is difficult to encompass
within the traditional account of institutional law-making. 133 It is telling
that organizations themselves are at odds with how to deal with these
instruments. The UN General Assembly, for instance, has taken various
approaches towards UNEP adopted standards. For example, while it
merely took note of the UNEP Principles on Shared National Resources
as “guidelines and recommendations” to be used in formulating
conventions, 134 it promulgated the World Charter for Nature by stating
that its principles “shall be reflected in the law and practice of each
State, as well as at the international level.” 135 The UNEP Governing
Council, in turn, asked states and international organizations to “take
. . . into account” the Montreal Guidelines on Land based Pollution.136
It is not clear whether these different forms of endorsement had any
impact on the reception of these instruments by states.
Secondly, a narrative that relies on the strict requirements of the
formal sources of international law equally struggles to explain the legal
character of decisions of COPs and MOPs, which are not treaty law
but, nevertheless, bind member states. 137 The difficulties arise
particularly in relation to those decisions that modify certain aspects of
131. ALVAREZ, supra note 107, at 232. See generally Mohamed Ali Mekouar,
Pesticides and Chemicals: The Requirement of Prior Informed Consent,
in THE ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES 146 (Dinah Shelton
ed., 2003).
132. ALVAREZ, supra note 107, at 222–23; David M. LEIVE, INTERNATIONAL
REGULATORY REGIMES: CASE STUDIES IN HEALTH, METEOROLOGY,
AND FOOD (1976).
133. SANDS ET AL., supra note 59, at 293–94; ALVAREZ, supra note 107, at
217–57, 595–97.
134. G.A. Res. 34/186 ¶¶ 2–3 (Dec. 18, 1979).
135. G.A. Res. 37/7 ¶ 14, World Charter for Nature (Oct. 29, 1982).
136. The Governing Council of the United Nations Environment Programme
Decision 13/18/11, Montreal Guidelines for the Protection of the Marine
Environment against Pollution from Land-based Sources, (May 24, 1985).
137. See generally Brunnée, supra note 39.
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treaty obligations that a qualified majority can adopt without a chance
for opposing states to opt out, therefore escaping the formal rules for
treaty amendment.
Finally, and more importantly, a narrative that labels most
instruments of international organizations as soft law is of limited
utility when what the traditional theory of sources of international law
can say about this category is little more than it not being formally
law. 138
A review of recent accounts on institutional law-making
demonstrates that the problem in contemporary narratives is not the
lack of realization that the normative output of international
organizations is expanding in size and variety and growing in
importance, a widely discussed trend. Instead, the main problem is that
theory has not been able to catch up with practice and has largely
remained unchanged since the creation of international organizations.
The traditional framework of institutional law-making rests on three
fundamental premises: (1) state consent as the basis of legitimacy of all
international rules; (2) a strict division between law and non-law; and
(3) the trilogy of formal sources as the only sources of international
law. 139 This traditional model sees international organizations as little
more than fora for negotiations between states and is unable to properly
address the innovative legislative techniques and dynamic law-making
processes that they have developed. 140 In fact, arguments that seek to
explain the normative authority of international organizations by
reference to formal law-making processes and a strict division between
soft and hard law are unsuccessful in filling the gap in the story of
institutional law-making. 141
In this context, the “soft law” label is used to encompass a great
number and variety of instruments adopted by international
organizations, which are adopted through different procedures and
influence international law in distinct ways. 142 In studying the
normative output of international organizations, one would expect that
138. See Klabbers, supra note 61, at 274; Matthias Goldmann, Inside Relative
Normativity: From Sources to Standard Instruments for the Exercise of
International Public Authority, 9 GERMAN L. J. 1865, 1869 (2008).
139. See generally Klabbers, supra note 61, at 272–75; Goldmann, We Need to
Cut Off the Head of the King, supra note 128, at 335–38.
140. White, supra note 128, at 579–80; Klabbers, supra note 61, at 274–75;
ALVAREZ, supra note 107, at 258–59.
141. See generally Klabbers, supra note 61 for the imagery of a gap in the
story.
142. Jaye Ellis, Shades of Grey: Soft Law and the Validity of Public
International Law, 25 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L. 313, 333 (2012) (arguing that
the definition of soft law encompasses such a wide range of phenomena
that the usefulness on the category for legal scholarship is limited).
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international lawyers should be able to describe and explain at least
some of this variety. However, this can only be achieved once we stop
applying a framework of analysis that, simply put, does not have the
vocabulary nor the analytical tools to deal with new phenomena that
did not exist at the time it was created. This position is not novel. In
1977, Schreuer argued that authors attempting to explain
recommendations of international organizations within the framework
of the traditional sources of international law were “tackl[ing] new legal
phenomena with a set of unsuitable theoretical tools.” 143 According to
Schreuer, explaining the relevance of recommendations by reference to
any of the sources in Article 38 was “hardly plausible.” 144 The UN
General Assembly itself noted this in Resolution 3232 (XXIX) of 22
November 1970, where it recognized that, “the development of
international law may be reflected, inter alia, by declarations and
resolutions of the General Assembly which may to that extent be taken
into consideration by the International Court of Justice.” 145
In 1981, Jennings advocated against trying “to force these newer
trends and techniques into one or other of the compartments of the
1920 mold.” 146 For Jennings, it was pointless to try to categorize, under
any of the traditional sources, the laws and regulations made by
international organizations in their specific fields. 147 Writing more
recently, Goldman agreed that the plurality of legal instruments of
international organizations “stands in marked contrast to the narrow
limits of the classical doctrine of the sources of international law as
stipulated in Article 38(1) of the ICJ Statute.” 148 Furthermore, the
constitutional ambitions of Article 38 have been long questioned— it is
hardly clear that the article was intended to do anything else besides
listing the types of instruments that the ICJ (and the Permanent Court
of International Justice before it) was to apply and especially that it

143. Christoph Schreuer, Recommendations and the Traditional Sources of
International Law, GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 103, 112 (1977).
144. Id.
145. GA Res. 3232(XXIX) (Nov. 22, 1974); Schreuer, supra note 143, at 112.
146. Robert Y. Jennings, What is International Law and How Do We Tell It
When We See It?, 37 SCHWEIZERISCHES JAHRBUCH FOR
INTERNATIONALES RECHT 59, 71 (1981) (referring to Article 38 of the
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice as the “1920
mould.”).
147. Id. at 70.
148. Goldmann, Inside Relative Normativity, supra note 138, at 1869; see also
Jan Klabbers, Constitutionalism and the Making of International Law:
Fuller’s Procedural Natural Law, 5 NO FOUNDATIONS 84, 92 (2008);
ALVAREZ, supra note 107, at 258.
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was intended as an exhaustive list of sources of international law
norms. 149
Nevertheless, despite the recurrence of the debate, the traditional
account of law-making by international organizations, originally
developed over a century ago as the first organizations appeared and
later strongly relying on the list of sources established in Article 38, has
lingered until today. 150 It is time international lawyers agree on its
limitations and find ways to overcome them.

4. Looking through a different lens
Moving beyond the deadlock in the study of institutional lawmaking requires international lawyers to change their analytical tools
and develop a new approach for analyzing the instruments of
international organizations. This requires actively challenging—and,
potentially, abandoning all together—the premises underlying the
traditional framework of institutional law-making, creating space to
test new ones.
A good place to start is by challenging the strict binary distinction
that contrasts law with non-law—and the consequent opposition
between binding and nonbinding instruments of international
organizations. In several cases, the formally binding or nonbinding
character of a rule is insufficient to explain its persuasiveness, authority,
and even compliance by states and other actors, making it clear that
theory no longer fits practice. The formally nonbinding character of
certain standards and guidelines on protection of the environment has
not prevented them from shaping state conduct. 151
However, current studies on law-making by international
organizations usually depart from the division of instruments into
binding and nonbinding. Handbooks on the law of international
organizations typically structure the discussion on the legal instruments
around four categories: conventions, binding decisions (or
determinations), nonbinding instruments (also referred to as soft law
and divided into recommendations and declarations), and internal rules
governing the functioning of the organizations (binding but without
external effects). 152 This initial labelling of instruments predetermines
149. Anthea Roberts & Sandesh Sivakumaran, The Theory and Reality of the
Sources of International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW 100 (Malcolm D.
Evans ed. 2018); Goldmann, We Need to Cut Off the Head of the King,
supra note 128, at 348–49; Klabbers, supra note 148, at 84.
150. See generally Klabbers, supra note 61.
151. See supra pp. 258–262.
152. See JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 156–57 (Cambridge Univ. Press, 3d ed.

262

Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 53 (2021)
The Role of International Organizations in the Development of
International Environmental Law: Adjusting the Lenses of Analysis

the result of all subsequent analysis into their law-making
characteristics—only the first two types of instruments are even
considered as being potentially law-creating.
But the problem goes beyond choosing the right moment for
classification. In fact, it is the very classification into binding and
nonbinding that is problematic, as it presupposes that international
normativity is an “all or nothing” variable—either an agreement fulfils
all the formal criteria, and it is part of binding international law, or it
is not law and has only political or moral significance. 153 The expansion
of the concept of soft law does not really solve this problem because
soft law instruments are still generally considered to be non-law, even
if they are “somehow of relevance to law.” 154 They are unable to create
binding obligations and, to the extent that it is sometimes admitted
that they can have legal effects, these are normally described in relation
to the formal sources of international law.
This ignores that there are instruments of so-called soft law that
share most characteristics of hard law—such as following a detailed
procedure for approval, sharing the characteristics of legal rules,
functioning just like international law norms, and as noted, often
achieving high levels of compliance. 155 The main difference is that,
generally, the violation of these norms does not entail specific legal
consequences—namely, it does not give rise to a claim of state
responsibility and the right to judicial enforcement. While relevant, this
characteristic does not seem sufficient to exclude these instruments
from the realm of international normativity—particularly considering
how this option is also not practically available for so many formal
international law norms and it is widely agreed not to be a defining
element of international law. 156 Instead, it is one of the characterizing
elements of these types of norms to be featured in their description
2015); BLOKKER & SCHERMERS, supra note 59, §§ 1196–1334; WHITE,
supra note 60, at 158–88.
153. Goldmann, We Need to Cut Off the Head of the King, supra note 128, at
341.
154. Ellis, supra note 142, at 319. See also THIRLWAY, supra note 65, at 188–
89; Redgwell, supra note 63, at 955–56.
155. See generally Goldmann, We Need to Cut Off the Head of the King, supra
note 128, at 336 (“why should soft law be excluded from the definition of
international law if it looks like international law and basically functions
like international law?”).
156. Cf. id. at 336, 341. Either because international dispute settlement is not
available due to absence of state consent to an international jurisdiction
or because the provisions are too vague to give rise to state responsibility,
id. See also JAMES CRAWFORD, BROWNLIE’S PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 15 (Oxford Univ. Press 9th ed. 2019); THIRLWAY,
supra note 65, at 2–3.
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within a revised doctrine of normative instruments of international
organizations.
Authors that argue for the inclusion of (at least, certain)
nonbinding instruments within an enlarged concept of international
legality advocate for one of two strategies—either they propose to revise
the rule of recognition to reach further than the formal sources doctrine
and encompass certain soft law instruments, or they sustain that
different rules of recognition should be identified to recognize different
levels of normativity.
Representative of the first type of propositions are the writings of
Klabbers and Brunnée and Toope. These authors depart from an
application of Fuller’s eight criteria for the morality of law to propose
that a revised rule of recognition should be based, not on formalistic
criteria, but on substantive requirements of legality. 157 According to
Fuller, legal rules must meet eight procedural criteria to be considered
moral and, as such, to be properly called law, they must be general,
publicized, prospective rather than retroactive, reasonably clear, not
contradict each other, not ask for the impossible, remain fairly constant
over time, and there should be some congruence between declared rules
and official action. 158 These are both a substantive set of criteria for the
validity of law and a formal criterion for the identification of law; law
that does not meet the eight requirements, at least to some extent,
would simply not be law. 159 Granted, these authors still support the
necessity of a formal rule of recognition to delineate the boundary
between law and non-law. 160 However, they sustain that the relevant
criterium for identification of international legal rules is not their
inclusion within instruments with certain formal characteristics but the
possession of certain internal characteristics, which entail their legal
legitimacy and persuasiveness. 161 Such an approach allows for the
inclusion of nonbinding instruments within the realm of international
law, as long as they comply with the requirements of legality. Brunnée
and Toope argue that certain nonbinding rules may even generate more
fidelity (i.e., attract its own adherence) than certain binding rules. 162
157. Goldmann, We Need to Cut Off the Head of the King, supra note 128, at
361–62
158. Or they must avoid “eight distinct routes to disaster.” LON L. FULLER,
THE MORALITY OF LAW: REVISED EDITION 39 (1969). See also Brunnée,
supra note 39, at 26; Jan Klabbers, supra note 148, at 84, 92.
159. Id. at 107.
160. Goldmann, We Need to Cut Off the Head of the King, supra note 128, at
361–63
161. Id.
162. JUTTA BRUNNÉE & STEPHEN J. TOOPE, LEGITIMACY AND LEGALITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: AN INTERACTIONAL ACCOUNT 27–28, 51 (2010).
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Goldmann, in turn, criticizes this approach for putting all
instruments on the same footing. 163 For Goldmann, the way forward is
to assume that different grades of legal normativity can exist, a position
that has been referred to as “relative normativity.” 164 Those different
levels would permit distinguishing between formal sources of
international law and other instruments which are not susceptible to
giving rise to damages or claims before international courts but,
nonetheless, share characteristics of legal rules. 165 Goldmann proposes
seeing normativity as a continuum, creating the possibility to identify
different categories of instruments. 166 He then argues that each category
of instruments resembles a self-contained regime, composed of
instruments that are comparable to such a degree that justifies the
development and application of one identical legal regime that sets up
rules regarding competence, procedure, and judicial review. 167 Finally,
he proposes that different rules of recognition should be conceived for
each category of instruments, which reflect their different
characteristics and legal effects. 168
A fitting solution is probably found somewhere in the middle. While
a broad analysis of the output of international organizations will
certainly reveal a diversity of normative instruments, displaying a
different number of legal characteristics and producing a diversity of
legal effects, all of which can be considered law-making, it must still be
possible for the international lawyer to distinguish normative
instruments from those that do not meet that qualification. 169 That is,
it should still be possible to formulate a rule of recognition to
distinguish international law from non-law, even when arguing that the
concept of law might contain different categories and levels of
normativity and that such a rule needs to incorporate enough flexibility
so that it can recognize a diversity of sources that goes well beyond the
formal sources of Article 38 and that will be different in different fields.
I argue, however, that the formulation of a revised rule of
recognition and an all-encompassing theory of law-making by
163. Goldmann, Inside Relative Normativity, supra note 138, at 1877.
164. Id. at 1872. See also Shelton, supra note 64, at 160. For a critique of
relative normativity see Weil, supra note 64.
165. Goldmann, Inside Relative Normativity, supra note 138, at 1876–77.
166. Id. at 1877.
167. Id. at 1877–81.
168. Id. at 1879–80.
169. Cf. Goldmann, We Need to Cut Off the Head of the King, supra note 128,
at 341–42 (admitting that there will still be a distinction between softlaw and non-soft law in his theory but noting that “it should make a
difference whether one recognizes only one single binary structured type
of law or two or multiple ones.”).
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international organizations is the last step of a long walk that
international lawyers are just starting. As a first step, it is fundamental
to deepen our understanding of the diverse legal outputs of
organizations to be able to construct a theory that covers the processes
taking place in the practice of organizations today. Particularly
concerning nonbinding instruments, the study of the individual
characteristics of each type of instrument has been largely absent.
For the sake of completeness of the analysis, and to advance
alternative paths for research and theory, I propose that it is necessary
to conduct research into the normative outputs of international
organizations while ignoring the strict binary law versus non-law and
collecting and analyzing the broadest variety of instruments. This is
particularly relevant for research focusing on law-making by
international organizations engaged in protection of the environment.
In few other fields is “law in its infinite variety” 170 as visible as it is here,
notably because of the relative infancy of the field and the unsystematic
way in which international regimes have emerged.
Looking into the different outputs of organizations in the
environmental field that were mentioned throughout this article, one
comes across a wide variety of instruments: (1) treaties (notably, the
MARPOL, adopted by the IMO), protocols, annexes, and amendments
to those; (2) instruments establishing new institutional structures, be
it new bodies of an organization aimed at dealing directly with certain
environmental matters (examples include the UNGA resolutions
establishing UNEP and the CSD) or joint institutional arrangements
where two or more organizations cooperate (such as the GEF); (3)
various decisions on implementation of treaty obligations and
compliance review adopted by COPs; (4) declarations of principles,
guidelines, and standards aiming to guide action on environmental
conservation (such as the UNEP Guidelines on Management of
Hazardous Waste and on Environmental Impact Assessment); and (5)
draft texts, which guide negotiations and can be adopted by states
(such as the draft texts of the UNFCCC and the Convention on
Biodiversity, prepared by the UN).
All these instruments have legal effects of their own, despite
differing in how they are created, who they address, how they function,
and the consequences of non-compliance. Some of them are the final
output of a legislative process, while others are meant as an
intermediary step, to be later taken up by other actors; some include
mandatory language, while others do not; some are addressed to states,
others also to different actors; some are meant to direct conduct, while
others to guide future law-making; some are adopted by unanimity,
other by consensus, others by majority; and not all of them rely on
170. Richard Baxter, International Law in Her Infinite Variety, 29 INT’L &
COMPAR. L. Q. 549 (1980).
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state consent. Little progress can be made in the doctrine by grouping
a good part of these instruments under the category of soft law and
analyzing them together.
Instead, an empirical analysis of the various normative activities of
international organizations must guide future research. Without the
constraints of the theory of sources and the strict binding versus
nonbinding division, it should paint a full picture of their normative
outputs and analyze their different characteristics, processes for
adoption, reception by states and other relevant actors, and impact in
shaping conduct and developing international law. It is only from such
an analysis that new ways of categorizing this infinite variety of
instruments can be developed and that international lawyers can start
developing the analytical tools they so desperately need to advance
their discussion and fill the gap in the story of institutional law-making.

5. Conclusion
The developments in normative processes in international
environmental law, where international organizations have played a
central role, have evidenced that the traditional account of institutional
law-making is increasingly at odds with international law-making
today. As international organizations are drafting the texts of
environmental treaties, adopting standards and guidelines that
effectively (and, sometimes, exclusively) regulate areas of practice, and
developing and altering treaty obligations (in some cases, dispensing
with the need for express consent by all state parties), it becomes
evident that it is not possible to continue explaining institutional lawmaking through the three dogmas of state consent, strict division
between law and non-law, and the trilogy of formal sources. The
limitations of this traditional framework are evidenced by the fact that
that all it can say about most normative outputs of international
organizations is that they are formally not law and, as such, should be
grouped under the category of soft law, despite their internal diversity
and that many share the characteristics of binding international law.
Accordingly, this article argued that international lawyers must
come to terms with the fact that the traditional framework of
institutional law-making does not have the vocabulary, nor the
analytical tools necessary, to deal with new diverse and dynamic lawmaking processes led by international organizations that did not exist
at the time that framework was created.
To move the debate forward and start closing the gap between the
practice of international organizations and the theory of institutional
law-making, it is fundamental that new approaches are developed that
actively challenge the premises of the traditional framework. To this
end, this article proposes the abandonment of the strict binary
opposition between law and non-law—at the very least, for the purpose
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of analysis. This will permit painting the full picture of normative
activities of international organizations and exploring the different
characteristics of their instruments, without an a priori judgement of
their aptitude to produce legal effects. It is only from such analysis that
international lawyers can start to develop the new analytical tools they
need to account for the full story of law-making by international
organizations in their different fields.
The crux of the matter is still the decades-old question famously
asked by Jennings, “what is international law and how do we know it
when we see it?” 171 In the case of the normative instruments of
international organizations, we need to change our reading lenses if we
aim to even start seeing, let alone explaining, their variety and their
contribution for the development of international law.

171. Jennings, supra note 146.

268

